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Scholarly debates on the right to 
education in India have primarily 
focused on examining the content 
of the right while paying little 
attention to the institutions 
enforcing it.  A study of the rules 
under the Right to Education Act 
in Karnataka shows that there are 
a multitude of authorities which 
perform grievance redress 
functions with overlapping 
jurisdictions. The rules create a 
parallel, informal grievance 
redress system that primarily 
comprises offi cials against whom 
grievances may arise.
 A  common refrain in India is that our statutory welfare rights suf-fer from weak implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement (Aiyar 2012 
and 2013; Panagariya 2013). Des pite this, 
we seldom pay attention to the role of 
grievance redress mechanisms in the 
enforcement of these rights. While a few 
studies have highlighted the role of so-
cial audits in social enforcement of the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) (Aiyar 
and Samji 2009; Shankar 2010), there is 
a serious lack of scholarly attention to the 
enforcement of the Right to Education 
(RTE) Act (hereafter, the Act). Recent 
scholarly debates on the right to educa-
tion in India have primarily f ocused on 
examining the content of the right 
(Ramachandran 2009; Sadgopal 2010 
and 2011; Aiyar 2012; Mehta 2012; Krish-
naswamy and Iyengar 2012; Sabherwal 
2012), paying little attention to the insti-
tutions enforcing it. In this article we re-
spond to this lack of academic attention 
to this important area of law and policy. 
We show that the offi cial mechanisms 
for grievance redress under the RTE in 
Karnataka are poorly developed and 
perplexing, and that substantial efforts 
need to be directed towards revamping 
existing institutions and processes to 
achieve signifi cant results.
An Overview
Mashaw (2006) distinguishes between 
three forms of accountability in public 
governance: administrative, legal and 
political. In addition to these individual 
forms of accountability, social accounta-
bility, which entails monitoring, exposing 
wrongdoing, etc (Joshi 2008) through 
collective action, is also gaining ground 
in enforcing social welfare delivery. This 
is evident particularly in the case of the 
MGNREGA. Though the grievance r edress 
system under the RTE provides space for 
all these different forms of a ccountabilities, 
it primarily assumes the shape of admin-
istrative accountability which by nature is 
hierarchical, managerial and continuous.
Typology of Grievances under the 
RTE: Section 9 of the Act directs local 
authorities1 to implement it. Additionally, 
Section 32 mandates local authorities to 
also perform grievance redress functions. 
A complaint may be fi led against any 
public offi cial or private person r espon-
sible for implementing the Act. Grievances 
under the Act may relate to bureaucratic 
non-performance,2 impediments in access 
to schools,3 non- performance of teachers,4 
school management committees (SMCs),5 
non-compliance with regulatory stand-
ards6 and violation of child rights through 
punishment and harassment,7 expulsion 
and detention,8 and denial of admission.9 
Types of grievances are, therefore, not 
limited to those against government of-
fi cials alone, and may arise against any 
stakeholder who is obligated under the Act. 
Legislations Governing RTE Grievance 
Redress: The Act and the Commissions 
for Protection of Child Rights (CPCR) Act, 
2005 provide the institutional and legal 
framework for RTE grievance redress 
in India.10 The RTE Act designates the 
National Commission for Protection of 
Child Rights (NCPCR) as the national level 
monitoring authority and the State Com-
missions for Protection of Child Rights 
(SCPCR) as the state level monitoring 
authority.11 As monitoring bodies, the 
commissions are expected to examine the 
prevalent safeguards for rights under the 
Act, inquire into complaints relating to a 
child’s right to education and take neces-
sary steps.12 Furthermore, SCPCRs are 
also responsible for acting as appellate 
grievance r edress bodies under the 
Act.13 In order to avoid duplicity of insti-
tutions monitoring child rights, the Act 
identifi es these authorities for the afore-
said functions.
Section 32 also provides that the “l ocal 
authority” is the fi rst level grievance 
r edress offi cer. It is vested with the 
functions of enforcing the right, i e, 
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resolving complaints and addressing 
 violations of the right to education. This 
authority is bound to resolve complaints 
by hearing both parties and within three 
months from the date of complaint. The 
Act encourages only written complaints. 
In 2012, the Ministry of Human 
 Resource Development (MHRD) issued an 
advisory14 to clarify that the local authori-
ties under Sections 9 and 32 of the Act 
need to be kept separate, as most of the 
grievances would arise against authorities 
implementing Section 9. According to 
the advisory, a grievance may arise as a 
result of a violation of any provision of 
the Act. It recommends that all state 
governments should identify grievance 
redress institutions at the village, block, 
mandal and district levels as “local au-
thorities”. The local authority must re-
solve a complaint within a period of 
three months, upon which the complain-
ant can appeal to the SCPCR.
Institutional Arrangements 
The Karnataka state government acting 
under the Act has designated a host of au-
thorities for its implementation. Under the 
Karnataka RTE rules, the block education 
offi cer (BEO), chief executive offi cer of the 
zilla panchayat (CEO-ZP) and the deputy 
director of public instruction (DDPI) are 
primarily responsible for implementing the 
Act under Section 9. In addition to this, 
schools, teachers and school development 
and management committees15 (SDMCs) 
are also responsible for its implementa-
tion. It is interesting to note that the 
Karnataka RTE rules do not defi ne the 
term “local authority” as defi ned under 
the Act;16 however, the rules vest func-
tions to implement the act in various offi -
cials u nder the education bureaucracy.17 
In addition to these authorities, the 
Karnataka state government, through a 
notifi cation issued in July 2012 and a 
government o rder (GO) of September 
2013, identifi ed different local authorities 
for grievance r edress. Moreover, the Karna-
taka rules vest functions that are similar 
to those of grievance redress in the BEOs, 
DDPI and CEO-ZP. Consequently, any per-
son aggrieved under the Act has the op-
tion of a pproaching a multitude of bodies. 
‘Local Authorities’ in Karnataka: T able 1 
maps the various institutions that are 
empowered to act as grievance redress 
authorities for the violation of the Act in 
Karnataka. 
As Table 1 indicates in Karnataka there 
are a multitude of authorities which per-
form grievance redress functions and many 
of these have overlapping jurisdictions. 
This leads to a series of problems, a few 
of which are illustrated here. 
First, the existence of multiple authori-
ties with overlapping jurisdictions does 
not provide clarity to the complainant on 
which of these forums can be approached. 
To elaborate, the District Level Education 
Regulating Authority (DLERA) is vested 
with grievance redress functions that cov-
er all provisions of the Act. Further, the 
s ocial justice committees (SJCs) are em-
powered to redress grievances against any 
l ocal authority for not performing func-
tions under Section 9, these functions al-
most cover the length and breadth of the 
Act.18 A complainant may approach either 
authority, and, may do so simultaneously. 
Neither the notifi cation nor the GO clari-
fi es whether the DLERA’s decision will pre-
vail over that of the SJC, or vice versa. 
Second, the Karnataka RTE rules vest 
powers similar to grievance redress in the 
CEO-ZP and the DDPI but do not formally 
designate them as “local authorities”. They 
articulate the nature of their authority 
to resolve complaints through inquiries 
and sanctions. Anecdotal evidence reveals 
that the BEO is the most sought after 
offi cial to look into complaints under the 
Act, however, the forwarding of these 
complaints to the relevant DLERA or SJC 
is yet to happen. Moreover, while the 
Table 1: Institutions Acting as First Level Grievance Redress Authorities in Karnataka
Institution Source of Authority Composition Jurisdiction & Powers
District Level Education Government Notification,  Deputy district commissioner, the CEO-ZP,  Empowered to look into all grievances arising
Regulation Authority (DLERA)  July 2012 executive engineer ZP, deputy director for  under the Act.
  pre-university education and DDPI. Orders of the DLERA are binding on the CEO-ZP, 
   DDPI and BEO.
Social Justice Committee (SJC)  Government Order, Typically 3-5 members mandatorily Empowered to redress grievances arising under
of Taluk Panchayat,   September 2013 comprising president of the taluk panchayat selective provisions of the Act.
Zilla Panchayat  or the zilla panchayat, one female  No clarity on whether they can issue binding
and Municipal Corporation  member and one member belonging  orders or if the authorities are bound by their
  to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe.  orders.
CEO-ZP Karnataka RTE Rules,   Officially identified as “local authority” for other
 April 2012  functions but not as “local authority” under 
   Section 32 for grievance redress. Also, vested with
   residuary functions under the Karnataka RTE Rules. 
   The CEO-ZP is empowered to issue orders on
   violation of any provisions of the RTE Act or
   Karnataka Rules.
   Orders of the DLERA and the Social Justice
   Committee are binding on the CEO-ZP.
   Orders of the CEO-ZP are binding on the BEO and DDPI 
   BEO and DDPI are empowered to address violations
   of any provisions of the RTE Act or Karnataka Rules
   and report to the CEO-ZP.
   Orders of the DLERA and CEO-ZP are binding 
   on the DDPI.
   DDPI’s Orders are binding on the BEO. 
DDPI Karnataka RTE Rules, April 2012  
BEO Karnataka RTE Rules, April 2012  
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notifi cation explicitly binds CEO-ZP, BEOs 
and DDPIs to execute the order of the 
DLERA, the relationship between the social 
justice committees and the education 
bureaucracy is unclear. The rules create 
a parallel, informal19 grievance redress 
system that primarily comprises offi cials 
against whom grievances may arise. 
Third, the formal grievance redress 
system under the notifi cation and the GO 
is severely tainted by confl icts of interest. 
To elaborate, the DDPI and the CEO-ZP are 
not only vested with implicit grievance 
redress functions under the Karnataka RTE 
Rules, but they are also members of the 
DLERA. There is no explicit mention of 
the roles these offi cials play in the work-
ing of the DLERA. Des pite the fact that 
the CEO-ZP and the DDPI are bound by 
the decisions of the DLERA, their inde-
pendent powers to address complaints 
make them capable of infl uencing the 
decisions of the DLERA. The existing system 
allows these offi cials to play an instru-
mental role in making d ecisions at the 
DLERA for complaints that may arise 
against their own actions. This relegates 
the grievance redress s ystem to one 
that is destined to make a complainant 
 apprehensive about approaching it.
Fourth, the deputy district commis-
sioner, an offi cial who performs several 
key administrative, revenue and magis-
terial functions, heads the DLERA. Even 
the CEO-ZP and SJCs perform several other 
functions that are not related to education 
alone. This leaves little time for these 
authorities to effectively address com-
plaints under the Act.
Fifth, one knows little about what kind 
of complaints are coming in or how they 
are being processed. There are no means 
to check pendency of complaints in this 
system as all authorities are e mpowered 
to deal with most types of violations. 
Violations could range from minor issues 
such as unavailability of uniforms to 
grievous violations such as denial of ad-
missions or physical abuse. This may lead 
to a situation where local authorities at 
any level may be burdened with every 
form of grievance, thus leading to inor-
dinate delays in resolving complaints.
There is a need to revise these instru-
ments in order to create a more meaning-
ful and accessible grievance redress 
system. To start with, the government 
may consider clarifying jurisdictions of 
various authorities, instituting mecha-
nisms to channel complaints through the 
formal grievance redress system and de-
marcating the specifi c of grievances to 
be resolved by different authorities.
The Karnataka SCPCR: The SCPCR as 
already mentioned is esta blished under 
the Commissions for Protection of Child 
Rights (CPCR) Act, 2005. The women 
and child development department of 
the state government appoints its mem-
bers. Empowering commissions that 
fall outside the MHRD’s jurisdiction to 
monitor implementation of the RTE Act 
keep the grievance redress system inde-
pendent of the education bureaucracy. 
However, the nature and effectiveness 
of this body requires further examina-
tion.20 We acknowledge that the NCPCR 
has also engaged in resolving com-
plaints under the RTE Act, however, we 
limit ourselves to focus on the role of the 
SCPCR in this article. 
Jurisdiction of the SCPCR: The com-
missions are established under the CPCR 
Act21 and are broadly responsible for the 
protection of child rights.22 Moreover, 
all procedures for operation and specifi c 
powers and functions for grievance 
 redress and monitoring under the Act23 
are largely related to their functions 
 under the CPCR Act. Under the CPCR Act, 
the commissions are independently em-
powered to inquire into complaints on 
violations of child rights; the Act there-
fore, only adds a right to the commis-
sions’ existing mandate. However, it is 
important to note that the Act does not 
clearly demarcate and defi ne the moni-
toring and grievance redress functions of 
the commissions. 
Additionally, the Act empowers the 
SCPCR to act as an appellate grievance 
r edress body. In the event a complainant 
is aggrieved by the decision of the local 
a uthority, she may appeal to the SCPCR for 
redress. These provisions lead to a situa-
tion where the SCPCRs have both original 
and appellate jurisdictions for redressing 
violations on the right to e ducation; there-
fore a complainant may d irectly approach 
the SCPCR or may do so by an appeal. 
The Karnataka SCPCR24 it is the appel-
late authority for grievance r edress un-
der the RTE Act. The Karnataka SCPCR 
comprises of seven members, including 
the chairperson, who have expertise in 
the area of child rights. Additionally, it is 
also provided with administrative and 
accounting staff. The Karnataka SCPCR 
Rules, 2010 also mandate a complaint 
management system that requires the 
commission to maintain records of com-
plaints and action taken reports. 
As mentioned above, the Karnataka 
SCPCR is empowered to inquire into all 
violations of child rights. In this regard, 
the SCPCR is empowered to make recom-
mendations, recommend compensation 
and to litigate when required.25 It is im-
perative to note that the SCPCR cannot 
 enforce its recommendations on the state 
government or compel it to act on them.
Two Years of RTE Grievance Redress: 
In the last two years, the Karnataka SCPCR 
has not received any formal appeals fi led 
against the order of any local authority; 
all complaints have been directly fi led 
before the Karnataka SCPCR. A dominant 
percentage of these cases are reported 
from Bangalore city, thus indicating a 
clear urban bias even though the crying 
need is at the r ural level where aware-
ness is low. Moreover, since no time limit 
has been imposed on the Karnataka 
SCPCR to resolve complaints related to 
the RTE Act, the average time taken by it 
to resolve a complaint is a minimum of 
two months. F inally the limited powers 
of the commission allow it to only make 
recommendations and hence, it cannot 
guarantee bureaucratic performance. 
Being devoid of any legal authority, 
the Karnataka SCPCR is taking recourse 
to popular mechanisms such as conduct-
ing public hearings. The commission 
conducted its fi rst RTE public hearing in 
September 2013 in Bangalore where 32 
cases were heard and disposed off. While 
the pro cess was intended to heighten 
awareness and redress grievances, the 
exercise r esulted merely in public repri-
mand of schools without any penalties 
and misapplication of the law in a few 
instances.26 Hence, there is a need to 
carefully evaluate the effectiveness of 
such processes that take recourse to 
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popular legality in the context of rights 
enforcement (Gauri 2013: 112). 
Other Mechanisms
Social Accountability: Apart from the 
administrative form of accountability 
discussed above, social accountability is 
envisaged in the Act through SDMCs. The 
SDMC that comprises parents, local a utho-
rities, teachers, two students and the head 
teacher of a school, acts as the primary unit 
of social accountability u nder the Act.27 
The SDMCs have the primary responsibility 
of monitoring the implementation of norms 
and standards in the school, preparing the 
school d eve lopment plan, monitoring uti-
lisation of grants, etc. Any tangible out-
comes of the SDMCs’ functions are de-
pendent on the amount of grants received 
by the school.28 In addition to these func-
tions, the Karnataka RTE rules assign the 
SDMCs with the additional responsibility 
of addressing grievances of teachers29 and 
monitoring cases of corporal punishment, 
mental harassment and discrimination.30 
However, this institution is only availa-
ble in government and aided schools, 
thus leaving a large section of unaided 
schools outside the ambit of any form of 
monitoring by them. Even where they 
are available, the SDMCs do not have any 
powers to enforce bureaucratic action.
Legal Accountability: Above all, the 
j udiciary acts as a parallel mechanism for 
rights enforcement where “judicial offi -
cials have the power to penalise g overn-
ment offi cials for clear illegalities and are 
created to be more impartial than other 
redress options” (Robinson 2013: 20). The 
Supreme Court31 and high courts32 at the 
state level are empowered to adjudicate 
upon cases involving violation of funda-
mental rights. These courts can enforce 
fundamental rights by issuing writs that 
can compel the state to take action on vio-
lations of fundamental rights.33 The Kar-
nataka High Court has witnessed a surge 
in RTE-related litigation in the form of pub-
lic interest litigations (PILs)34 and the Su-
preme Court has been adjudicating upon 
the consti tutional validity of the Act35 and 
also  emphasising its implementation.36 
Additionally, lower courts are not spe-
cifi cally barred from adjudicating upon 
cases under the Act.37 Ordinarily, these 
courts do not adjudicate upon cases that 
involve infringement or enforcement of 
fundamental rights. However, the right 
to education raises a new legal question 
as it imposes positive obligations upon the 
state to implement the right through a 
statute.38 It appears that complainants 
may approach lower courts for injunctive 
relief under the Specifi c Relief Act, 1963. 
Under this law, courts are empowered to 
issue different types of injunctive re-
liefs39 to compel performance of obliga-
tions40 under any law.41 Civil courts are 
empowered to issue temporary,42 per-
petual,43 mandatory44 and prohibitive45 
injunctions under this law. 
The existence of a statutory obligation 
and the competence of the court to en-
force the obligation are prerequisites for 
issuing mandatory injunctions under the 
Specifi c Relief Act, 1963 (Pollock and 
Mulla 2011: 2893). Complainants may 
approach the civil courts for injunctive 
relief, particularly perpetual injunctions, 
only if there is no “equally effi cacious 
 relief” available under the relevant stat-
ute.46 In the context of the Act, it appears 
that a complainant has an alternative relief 
available under Section 32. However, the 
existing system marred by severe confl icts 
of interest, and the Karnataka SCPCR’s 
recommendations which cannot compel 
bureaucratic action to enforce the right 
render the system incapable of enforcing 
the right effectively. This may necessitate 
the courts to question the e ffi caciousness 
of the grievance redress system and 
open their doors to prospective com-
plainants seeking rights enforcement. 
Conclusions
The hallmark of recent statutory rights to 
welfare such as education, work and food 
is that they create binding obligations on 
the state to deliver these rights. A mean-
ingful shift from political to legal ac-
countability however, can be achieved 
through increased awareness, provisions 
for assistance to communities’ complaints 
and responsive institutional structures. 
A preliminary examination of the insti-
tutional design and performance of the 
Karnataka grievance redress system 
 under RTE reveals that it is far from 
 pro viding any of these conditions, as a 
 result of which, legal accountability has 
not taken off.
The Karnataka RTE rules and other poli-
cy documents have contributed towards 
creating a web of “local authorities” with 
unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. 
Though the system provides for multiple 
entry points for a complainant, it increases 
the chance of red tape and delays and does 
little to raise awareness or provide any 
space for social mobilisation. While the 
original jurisdiction of the Karnataka SCPCR 
seems to be popular, its appellate authority 
has been non-functional. Vested with only 
recommendatory powers, the Karnataka 
SCPCR is taking recourse to populist proc-
esses such as the recently conducted RTE 
public hearing which has no legal sanction 
whatsoever. With falter ing administrative 
account ability, many complainants still fi nd 
themselves with unresolved grievances 
and are tending to take recourse to political 
and even “rude” forms of accountability.
In light of these issues, it is imperative 
that the state provides a well-developed 
matrix of authorities for grievance redress 
with clearly defi ned appellate structures 
and powers.47 It may even be useful to 
conceptualise a one-stop window for han-
dling all complaints relating to RTE through 
technology-enabled service delivery mech-
anisms such as the Sakala Mission. This 
would save citizens from the diffi culties of 
having to navigate through the bureau-
cratic labyrinth that delay enforcement. 
Moreover, for the Karnataka SCPCR to act 
as a credible original or appellate autho-
rity, it may be benefi cial to amend the 
CPCR Act in order to revamp its member-
ship design and substantially increase its 
powers and authority in ways that can 
enforce bureaucratic action and enforce 
sanctions against schools. Alternatively, 
courts have to be imagined as an impor-
tant institution for rights enforcement. 
This includes not only the role of high 
courts but also that of lower courts in 
enforcing the right to education. 
Notes
 1 Section 2 (h) of the RTE Act defi nes a “local 
authority” as “a Municipal Corporation or 
Muni cipal Council or Zilla Parishad or Nagar 
Panchayat or Panchayat, by whatever name 
called, and includes such other authority or 
body having administrative control over the 
school or empowered by or under any law for 
the time being in force to function as a local 
authority in any city, town or village”.
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(Pollock and Mulla 2011: 2815). 
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institutions and offi cials across the state’s edu-
cation department and local bodies such as the 
panchayats and municipal corporations. However, 
this system is developed under a clear matrix of 
functions, powers and timelines. (Government 
of Gujarat Education Department Resolution 
No PRE-1112-GOI-29-K, dated 30 April 2013 
available at: http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_
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